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the Supreme Court of the United States, December Term, 1852.
ELISHA BLOOMER VS. JOHN W. M'QUEWAN, ET AL.

1. Where M., in 1853, purchased a right to construct and use certain patent machines, and under this right did construct and put in operation the machines, the
right to their use does not terminate with the expiration of the original patent,
but still continues under an extension or enlargement of the grant by Act of.
Congress.
2. There is a distinction between the grant of a right to make and vend a machine,
and a grant of the right to use it.
3. Wilson v. Rosseau, 4 How. 688, approved.
3. A special Act of Congress in favor of a patentee, extending the time beyond that
originally limited, is engrafted on the general law, unless the language of the Act
should require a different construction.
5. Qu? Whether Congress could pass a law which should deprive the citzen of the
use of his property after he had purchased the absolute right to use from the
inventor.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States
for the Western District of Pennsylvania.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY.-The bill in this case was filed by
the appellants, on the 6th of July, 1850, in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania, to obtain

an injunction restraining the appellees from the use of two of
Woodworth's planing machines in the City of Pittsburg. The term
for which Woodworth's patent was originally granted expired in
1842, but it was extended seven years by the Board established by
the 18th section of the Act of 1886. And afterwards, by the Act
of 1Congress of February 26, 1845, this patent was extended for
seven years more, commencing on the 27th of December, 1849, at
which time the previous extension would have terminated.
It appears from the pleadings and evidence in the case, that
shortly after the passage of the Act of Congress -of 1845, William
Woodworth, the administrator of the patentee, in whose name the
certificate of extension was directed to be issued, assigned all his
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right to James G. Wilson, from whom the appellant purchased the
exclusive right to construct and use this machine, and to vend to
others the right to construct and use it, in a large district of country
described in the grant. Pittsburg, in which thezmachines in question are used, is included within these limits. And the right which
the appellant purchased was regularly transferred to him by Wilson
by an instrument of writing duly recorded in the patent office.
In the. yeai: i883, during the term for wlich the patent was
originally granted, the defendants purchased the right to construct
and use a certain number of these machines within the limits of the
city of Pittsburg-and Aileghany county: and the' right to do so was
regularly transferred to them by different assignme.nts, deriving
their title from the original patentee. The two machines mentioned
in the bill were constructed and used by the respondents soon after
the purchase was made, and the appellees continued to use them up
to the time when this bill was filed. And the question is, whether
their right to use them terminated with the first'extension, or still
continues under the extension granted by the act of 1845.
The Circuit Court decided that the right of the appellees still
continued, and upon that ground dismissed the appellant's bill.
And the case is now before us upon an appeal'from that decree.
In determining this question we must take into consideration not
only the special act under which the appellant now claims a monopoly, but also the general laws of Congress in relation to patents for
useful improvements, and the special acts which have from time to
time been passed in favor of particular patentees. They are statutes
inlparimateria: and all relata to the same subject, and must be construed together. It was so held in the case of .Evans vs. Eaton, 3
Wheat. 518, where the court said that the special Act of Congress in,
favor of Oliver Evans, granting him a new patent for fourteen years
for his improvements in manufacturing flour and meal was engrafted
on the general act for the promotion of useful arts, and the patent
issued in pursuance of both. The rule applies with moje force in
the. present case; for this is not the grant of a new patent, but an
enlargement of the time for which a patent previously extendedunder the Act of 1886, should continue in force.
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1Indeed, this rule of construction is necessary to give effect to the
special act under which the appellant claims the monopoly. For
this law does not define the rights or privileges which the patent
shall confer, nor prescribe the remedy to which he shall be entitled
if. his rights are infringed. It merely extends the duration of the
patent, and nothing more. And we are necessarily referred, therefore, to the general law upon the subject to ascertain the rights to
which the patent entitled him, and also the remedy which the law
affords him if these rights are invaded.
Now, the Act of 1836 in express terms gives the benefit of the extension authorized by that law to the assignees and grantees of the
right to use the thing patented to the extent of their respective
interests therein. And under this provision it was decided in the
case of Wilson vs. Rou8seau, 4 How. 668, that the party who had
purchased and was using this planing machine during the original
term for which the patent was granted, bad a right to continue the
use during the-extension. And the distinction is there taken between the grant of the right to make and vend the machine, and
the grant of the right to use it.
The distinction is a plain one.. The franchise which the patent
grants consists altogether in the right to exclude every one from
making, using, or vending the thing patented without the permission of the patentee. This is all that he obtains by the patent.
And when he sells the exclusive privilege of making or vending it
for use in a particular place, the purchaser buys a portion. of the franchise which the patent confers. He obtains a share in the monopoly,
and that monopoly is derived from, and exercised unier, the pro,
tection of the United States. And the interest he acquires necessarily terminates at the time limited for its continuance by the law
which created it. The patentee cannot sell it for a longer time.
And the purchaser buys with reference to that period; the time for
which the exclusive privilege is to endure being one of the chief
elements of its value. He therefore has no just claim to share in a
further monopoly subsequently acquired by the patentee.. He does
not purchase or pay.for it.
But the purchaser of the implement or machine for the purpose
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of using it in the ordinary pursuits of life, stands on different ground.
In using it he exercises no rights created by the act of Congress,
nor does he derive title to it by virtue of the franchise or exclusive
privilege granted to the patentee. The inventor might lawfully sell
it to him whether he had a patent or not, if no other patentee stood
in his way. And when the machine passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly. It passes
outside of it, and is no longer under the protection of the Act of
Congress. And if his right to the implement or machine is infringed,
he must seek redress in the courts of the State, according to the
laws of the State, and not in the courts of the United States, nor
under the law of Congress granting the patent. The implement or
machine becomes his private individual property, not protected by
the laws of the United States, but by the laws of the State in which
it is situated. Contracts in relation to it are regulated by the laws
of the State, and are subject to State jurisdiction. It Was so decided
in this court in the case of Wil8on vs. Sanford and others, 10 How.
99. Like other individual property, it is then subject-to State taxation ; and from the great number of' patented articles now in use,
they no doubt, in some of the States, form no inconsiderable portion of its taxable property.
Moreover, the value of the implement or machine in the hands of
the purchaser for use does not in any degree depend on the time
for which the exclusive 'privilege is granted to the patentee, nor
upon the exclusion of others from its use. For example, in the
various patented articles used in agriculture, in milling, in manufactures' of Tifferent kinds, in steam engines, or for household or
other purposes, the value to the purchaser is not enhanced by the
continuance of the monopoly. It is of no importance to him
whether it endures for a year or twenty-eight years. He does not
look to the duration of the exclusive privilege, but to the usefulness
of the thing he buys, and the advantages he will derive from its use.
He buys'the article for the purpose of using it as long as it is fit for
use and found to be profitable. And in the case before us the respondents derive no advantage from the extesibn of the patent,
because the. patentee may place around them as many planing ma-
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chines as he pleases, so as to reduce the profits of those which they
own to their just value in an open and fair competition.
It is doubtless upon these principles that the act of 1886 draws
the distinction between the assignee of a share of the monopoly,
and the purchase of one or more machines, to be used in the ordinary pursuit of business. And" that distinction is clearly pointed
out and maintained in the case of Wil8on vs. Bouseau, before referred to.
Upon the authority therefore of the case of Evans vs. Eaton,
and Wilson vs. Rousseau, these two propositions may be regarded
as settled by judicial decision.
1. That a special Act of Congress in favor of a patentee, extending the time beyond that originally limited, must be considered as
engrafted on the general law, and 2dly, that under the general law
in force when this special Act of Congress was passed, a party who
had purchased the right to use a planing machine during the period
to which the patent was first limited, was entitled to continue to use
it during the extension authorized by that law.
Applying these rules to the case before us, the respondents must
be entitled to continue the use of their planing machines during the
time for which the patent is extended by the special Act of Congress,
unless there is something in the language of the law requiring a different construction.
But there is nothing in the law to justify the distinction claimed
in this respect on behalf of the patentee. Its language is plain
and unambiguous. It does not even grant a new patent as in the
case of Oliver Evans. It merely extends the time of the monopoly
to which the patentee was entitled under the general law of 1836.
It gives no new rights or privileges, to be superadded to those he
then enjoyed, except as to the time they should endure. The patent, such as it then was, is continued for seven years longer than
the period before limited. And this is the whole and only provision contained in this special act. In order, therefore, to determine the rights of the patentee during the extended term,*we are
necessarily referred to the general law ; and compelled to #inquire
what they were before this special act operated upon them, and
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continued them. Indeed the court has been obliged to recur to the
Act of 1836 in every stage of this suit, to guide it in deciding upon
the rights of the parties, and the mode of proceeding in which they
are to be tried. It is necessarily referred to in order to determine
whether the patent under which the complainant claims, was issued
by lawful authority, and in the form prescribed by law; it was
necessary to refer to it in the Circuit Court in order to determine
whether the patentee was entitled to the patent, as the original inventor, that fact being disputed in the Circuit Court; also, for the
notices to which he was entitled in the trial of that question; and
for the forum in which he was authorized to sue for an infringement
of his rights. And the rights of the appellant to bring the case
before this court for adjudication is derived altogether from the provisions of the general law. For there is no evidence in the record
to show that the machines are worth two thousand dollars, and no
appeal therefore would lie from the decision of the Circuit Court,
but for the special provision in relation to patent cases in the Act of
1836. And while it is admitted .that this special Act is so engrafted
on the general law, as to entitle the patentee to all the rights and
privilegep which that law has provided, for the benefit and protection of inventors, it can hardly be maintained that the one in favor
of the purchaser of a machine is by construction to be excepted
from it, where there are no words in the special Act to indicate that
such was the intention of Congress.
This construction is confirmed by the various special acts which
have been passed from time to time, in favor of particular inventors, granting them new patents after the first had expired or extending the time for which they were originally granted. Many of
these acts have been referred to in the argument, some of which
contain express provisions, protecting the rights of the purchaser
under the first term, and others contain no provision on the subject,
and merely grant a new patent, or as in the case before the court,
extend the duration of 'the old one. And in several instances special laws in favor of different inventors have been passed within a
short time of each other, in one of which the rights of the previous
purchaser are expressly reserved, and in others there is no provision
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on the subject. And the Act of March 3, 1845, authorizing the
patent of William Gale, for ap improvement in the manufacture of
silver spoons and forks to be extended, was passed only a few days
after the Act in favor of Woodworth, and Gale's patent is subjected
in express terms to the conditions and restrictions in the Act of 1836,
and consequently protects previous purchasers from a new demand.
It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the insertion of these restrictions in one special law, and the omission of
them in another, shows that in the latter Congress did not intend
to exempt the purchaser from the necessity of obtaining a new
license from the patentee. And that Congress might well suppose
that one inventor had stronger claims upon the public than another,
and might on that account give him larger privileges on the renewal.
But this argument only looks to one side of the question, that is
to the interest and claims of 'the inventor. There is another, and
numerous class of persons who have purchased patented articles,
and paid for them the full price which the patentee demanded, and
we are bound to suppose that their interests and their rights would
not be overlooked or disregarded by Congress. And still less, that
any distinction would be drawn between those whopurchased one
description of patented machines and those who purchased another.
For example, the Act granting a new patent to Blanchard, in 1834,
for cutting or turning irregular forms, saves the rights of those who
had bought under the original patent. And we ought not to presume without plain words to require it, that while Congress acknowledged the justice of such claims, in the case of Blanchard, they intended to disregard them in the case of Woodworth. Nor can it be
said that the policy of Congress has changed in this respect after
1834, when Blanchard's patent was renewed. For as we have already said the same protection is given to purchasers in the special
law, authorizing the renewal of Gale's patent, which was passed a
few days after the law of which we are speaking.
The fair inference from all of these special laws is this, that Congress has constantly recognized the rights of those who purchase for
use, a patented implement or machine; and in the sevarious special
laws the patentee and purchasers of different inventions were in-
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tended to be placed on the same ground; and that the relative
rights of both parties under the extension, by special act of Congress, were intended to be the same as they were when the extension was granted under the general law of 1836. It would seem
that in some cases the attention of the legislature was more particularly called to the subject, and the rights of the purchaser recognized, and cautiously guarded. And when the provision is omitted, the just presumption is, that Congress legislated on the principle decided by this court in Evans vs. Eaton, and regarded the
special law as engrafted on the general one, and subject to all of
its restrictions and provisions, except only as to the time the patent should endure. Time is the only thing upon which they legislate. And any other construction would make the legislation of
Congress on these various special laws, inconsistent with itself, and
impute to it the intention of dealing out a different measure of justice to purchasers of different kinds of implements and machines,
protecting some of them, and disregarding the equal and just claims
of others.
And if such could be the interpretation of this law, the power of
Congress to pass it would be open to serious objections. For it
can hardly be maintained that Congress could lawfully deprive a
citizen of the use of his property after he had purchased the absolute and unlimited right from the inventor, and when that property
was no longer held under the protection and control of the General
Government, but under the protection of the State, and on that account subject to state taxation.
The 5th amendment to the Constitution of the United States declares, that no pers6n shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.
The right to-construct and use these planing machines, had been
purchased and paid for without any limitation as to the time for
which they were used. They were the property of the respondents.
Their only value consists in their use. And a special act of Congress passed afterwards depriving the appellees of the right to use
them, certainly could not be regarded as due process'of law.
Congress. undoubtedly have power to promote the progress of
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science and useful artsby securing, for limited times, to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries.
But it does not follow that Congress may from time to time, as
often as they think proper, authorize the inventor to recall rights
which he had granted to others; or re-invest in him rights of property which he had before conveyed for a valuable and fair cQnsideration.
But we forbear to pursue this inquiry because we are of opinion
that this special Act of Congress does not, and was not intended to
interfere with rights of property before acquired; but that it leaves
them as they stood during the extension under the general law.
And in this view of the subject the appellant was not entitled to the
injunction he sought to obtain, and the Circuit Court were right in
dismissing the bill.
As the decision on this point disposes of the case, it is unnecessary to examine the other grounds of defence taken by the appellees.
The decree of the Circuit Court must be affirmed.

In the S preme Court of Connecticut.
DERWORT AND WIFE v9. LOOMER.

1

1. The Court is reluctant, at all times, to set aside the verdict of a jury because
they have erred in weighing evidence; nor will the Court feel at liberty to do this,
where the jury have passed upon a mere question of fact, unless the verdict is so
palpably against.the evidence as to show that their minds were not open to reason
and conviction, or that an improper influence was brought to bear on their deliberations.
2. But where the action was for injuries to the plaintiff, by the overturning of a
stage-coach in which she was a passenger, resulting from the negligence of the
defendant's agent; and from the undisputed. facts in the case, the Court could
see, that there was culpable negligence in the defendant's agent; the defence
rested, not only upon the absence of such negligence, but a settlement and discharge by the plaintiff's attorney, whose authority was denied; and both issues
being submitted to the jury upon the evidence, they gave a verdict for the defendI We are indebted to the Hon. Thos. Day, the State Reporter, for this case,
which will be found reported in 21 Conn. Rep. 245, now about issuing from the press.
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dant; it was held, that the jury must have proce~led upon false notions of law,
and as, in the opinion of the Court, the verdict was against the evidence, on both
grounds, a new trial was granted.
8. In such cases, legal negligence is not a pure question of fact for the jury, but is
mixed up with principles of law, so that its determination involves a conclusion of
law, or more properly, a rule of responsibility, to be applied by the Court.
4. In the case of common carriers of passengers, the highest degree of care, which
a reasonable man would use, is required by law.
5. This rule applies alike to the character of the vehicle, the horses and harness,
the skill and sobriety of the driver, his watchfulness, and his conduct, under
eveiy emergency or difficulty.
6. The contract to carry passengers differs from that to carry freight only in this,
that in the latter case, the carrier is respon'sible at all events, except for the act
of God and the public enemy.
7. Public notice given by a carrier, that he will not be responsible for freight, or that
it is at the risk of the owner, will not vary the carrier's liability.
8. Norwill the custom of stage proprietors and their drivers to load down the vehicle
with passengers and freight to its utmost capacity, regardless of the state of the
roads, exonerate them from liability.
9. The practice of converting stage-coaches into freight wagons, to transport iron,
and almost every thing else, is an innovation upon the rights of the travelling community, which the Court will not sanction or countenance.
10. An attorney employed to commence and prosecute a suit, but not otherwise
authorized, has no power to settle that suit, and discharge the defendant from the
plaintiT's claim.

This was an action on the case, for injuries sustained by Marion
Derwort, one of the plaintiffs, and wife of George H. Derwort, the
other plaintiff, in consequence of the overturning of a stage-coach,
owned by the defendant, and used by him for the conveyance ofpassengers for hire, from Bridgeport to Derby.
The declaration, after alleging that the defendant received said
Marion as a passenger, to be conveyed safely in his stage-coach,
from Bridgeport to Derby, for a certain reward, averred, that the
defendant, not regarding his duty, did not use proper care, but
neglected so to do, and suffered a large quantity of iron, to wit:
one ton of iron, and divers other ponderous articles, to be deposited
on the top of said coach; and did permit said coach to be greatly
overloaded; and did permit said coach to-be driven in and over an
unsafe.and unusual part of the road, from said Bridgeport to said
Derby, so that by means of said iron being deposited onsaid coach
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as aforesaid, and by reason of said coach being overloaded, and also
by reason of the coach being driven upon and over an unsafe and
unusual part of said highway, by the defendant, and while said
coach was proceeding with said Marion therein, in and along the
public highway from Bridgeport to Derby, and before the arrival
of te same at Derby, the coach was overturned; by means whereof,
one of the arms of said Marion was broken, and she was otherwise
greatly bruised, wounded, and injured, and became sick, sore, lame
and disordered, and has so continued to the present time.
The defendant pleaded, 1st, the general issue; 2dly, a release
and discharge of the defendant, by Henry T. Huggins, Esq., the
attorney of the plaintiffs, in consideration of the sum of 350 dollars,
paid by him to said George H. Derwort; which sum the latter
accepted and received of the defendant, in full satisfaction and
discharge of the grievances alleged.On these issues the cause was- tried, at New Haven, January
Term, 1851.
From the whole testimony the following facts were proved, with
little or no discrepancy: On the 13th of February, 1849, the
plaintiffs took passage at Bridgeport in a stage-sleigh, owned by the
defendant, and driven by James Bradley from that city to Birmingham, in the town of Derby. There were eleven passengers, exclusive of two children of the plaintiffs, their luggage, and a quantity
of iron, (upwards of 40.0 lbs.) on the top,.projecting before and
behind. After going between one or two miles from Bridgeport,
northerly, towards Birmingham, the sleigh passed into~a deep cut,
where the snow was blown in; the sleigh being on double sets of
runners, the fore runners went steady, while the hind runners slid
round, and the vehicle with its contents turned over. Mrs. Derwort's arm was broken, and she was otherwise bruised and injured.
This was, in! some degree, a dangerous place. On the west bank
of the road, the snow was deep; on the right, there was a hollow
or gutter. On the question of negligence in the driyer, in this
instance, the testimony was various and somewhat, discordant ; but
that he had experience in this business, was of good habits and
generally careful, was admitted or proved, and not denied.
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The cause was submitted to the jury upon the evidence; and
they returned a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiffs thereupon moved for a new trial, for a verdict against the evidence.
Dutton and E. K. Foster, in support of the motion.
. A.'Ingtrsoll and Blackman, contra.
ELLSWORTE, J.-This is a motion for a new trial, because the
verdict is against evidence.
It has been argued before us, as if two issues had been tried to
the jury; one upon the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
declaration, and the other, the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the plea of accord and satisfaction, and release.
We are of opinion the jury erred, in rendering their verdict for
the defendant, on either ground of defence, and so obviously erred,
that we shall allow the plaintiffs to present, their cause for trial, to
another jury.
The Court is reluctant, at all times, to set aside the verdict of a
jury, for the cause that they have erred in weighing evidence; nor
do the Court feel at liberty to do this, where the jury have passed
upon a mere question of fact, unless we see that the verdict is so
palpably and manifestly against evidence, as that it is apparent
their minds were not open to reason and conviction, or that an
improper influence, from some cause or other, was brought to bear
on their deliberations. We do not say that this is that case; nor
that we would now interpose and grant a new trial, did we consider
the verdict as involving matters of fact only. But it involves
more. We think the jury must have proceeded upon false notions
of law; certainly they-did, if they found there had been no fault
or negligence on the part of the defendant or his agent. Neglect
of duty, or legal negligence, is not, in all cases, a pure question of
fact for the jury, but is often mixed up with principles of law, so
that negligence becomes a conclusion of law rather than of fact;
or more properly, it becomes a rule of -responsibility, which Courts,
through the verdict, aim to have applied faithfully and uniformly.
Jurors not unfrequently entertain singular notions of the accountability of common tarriers and stage proprietors; and they will,
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sometimes, pertinaciously follow out those notions, notwithstanding
the instructions and efforts of the Court to the contrary.
Upon the undisputed facts in this case, we believe there was clear
culpable negligence in the defendant's agent. Here was a stagesleigh, loaded'within and without with passengers, thirteen in number, on narrow double runners, (of course somewhat unsteady,)
passing on a road made smooth and sidling, by constant use. And
this place was on the edge of a dangerous gutter, which the driver
well knew from his long familiarity with the road, both in summer
and winter. The danger was enhanced, by the 418 pounds of iron
stowed upon the top. Nothing was more probable than that this
sleigh would upset, in any place of danger or-difficulty. The hind
runners slid down the declivity of the worn road into the gutter
below, and the stage was upset. It might, under the circumstances,
have been expected, and need not be ascribed to any accidental
cause; nothing extraordinary had happened, and no difficulty existed
but what a prudent, careful man could and would have foreseen
and avoided. Beyond a question, this stage, for such a road, was
greatly overloaded and rendered unmanageable. The place in the
road had become dangerous from the very great use to which it had
been subjected on the day of the accident, and the day previous;
together with the recent fall of snow. Why, we ask, did the accident happen.
Why did the stage upset? It was broad day; the
horses were under entire command, and nothing had given way.
Now, while we would not be too rigorous in laying down the degree
of attention required from stage proprietors and railroad companies
in transporting passengers, we must hold them to the greatest care
and watchfulness.
The rule of law on this subject, is fully established in our own
Courts and elsewhere, and is not controverted -by the learned counsel in this case. The principle is, that in the case of common
carriers of passengers, the highest degree of care which a reasonzable
man would use, is required. This rule applies alike to the character of the vehicle, the horses and harness, the skill and sobriety of
the driver, and to the manner of conducting the stage, under every
emergency or difficulty. The driver must, of course, be attentive
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and watchful. He has, for the time being, committed to his trust
the safety and lives of people, old and young, women and children,
locked up, as it were, in the coach or rail-car, ignorant, helpless,
and having no eyes or ears, or power to guard against danger, and
who look to him for safety in their transportation. The contract
to carry passengers differs, it is true, from a contract to carry
freight; but in both casjs, the rule is rigorous, and imperative; in
the latter, the carrier is answerable at all events, except for the
act of God and the public enemy; while, in the former, the most
perfect care of prudent and cautious men is demanded and required.
The stage owner does not warrantthe safety of passengers; yet
his undertaking and liability as to them, go to this extent; that he
or his agent, shall possess competent skill, and that, as far as human
foresight and care can reasonably go, he will transport them safely.
He is not liable for injuries happening to passengers, from sheer
accident or misfortune, where there is no negligence or fault, and
where no want of caution, foresight or judgment, would prevent the
injury. But he is liable for the smallest negligence in himself or
his driver. IHall vs. Connecticut River ,Steamboat Co., 13 Conn.
R. 320. Stoke8 vs. Saltondtall, 13 Pet. R. 191.
The defendant relies upon his proof, that the stage was not overloaded; that thirteen passengers with their baggage, and with
freight to the amount of 418 pounds, placed on the top, is not
unreasonable or excessive. He says his sleigh was strong, his
horses kind, his driver skillful and sober; and that this is enough
to screen him from liability. Now, all this may be true; and yet,
there may have been, and we think there was, great and culpable
negligence. Obviously, the place had become unsafe and perilous.
If the sleigh slipped on the margin of the gutter, it was sure to
upset, -and if it did upset, the weight of the iron was likely to produce the very result we discover, i. e., pinning down' Mrs. Derwort
with her broken arm until the iron could be removed and she
rescued from her alarming condition. We see not why the driver
could not have gone, as in fact others did, further East or further
West. If necessary, he should have stopped the hqrses, and descended from his seat, and examined the difficulties in the way.
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le could have beaten down the drift of snow, if really blocking the
path, and he could not otherwise have sufficiently bugged the West
bank, or he should have examined and gone, as he certainly might,
in the gutter on the East; and if he could not have done either, he
should have given the passengers notice of the danger that was
apparent, that they might have left the sleigh, and thus saved themselves from the imminent danger of passing upon the brink of this
gutter. This carefulness might have occasioned some delay and
trouble to the driver; but it is no more than what a reasonable
man would have done on the occasion; and if done, it would have
saved a world of suffering, and an injury to Mrs. Derwort, which
makes her helpless and dependent through life.
It is no apology that freight is put upon these stages, as in this
case, under public or any other notices. The liability continues
the same. Nor is it any apology, that stage proprietors and their
drivers are accustomed to load down their stages with passengers
and freight, notwithstanding the state of the roads, until nothing
more can be crowded within or accumulated on the top. It is high
time that the law on this subject should be better understood and
,regarded; and that such unpardonable liberties should cease to be
taken, by persons who stipulate to carry passengers safely and
without exposure. Converting stage-coaches into freight wagons,
to transport iron, and well-n-gh every thing else, is the last innovation upon the rights of the traveling community, and it is .one
which we do not intend to sanction or countenance.
As to the compromise and release by Mr. Huggins, for the sum
of 850 dollars, paid to him by the defendant, if that was the ground
of the verdict, we fear the jury gave it an importance in their
deliberations to which it is not eiltitled. If indeed, the defendant
was frank and fair in seeking the plaintiff's lawyer at all, rather
than the plaintiffs themselves, for the purpose of effecting a compromise, and has properly settled the case, by paying said lawyer
the stipulated satisfaction, it is hard, we admit, that he should be
obliged to pay it again; but the loss must fall upon one of these
parties; and we know of no rule, but what the law declares, to
say which shall- bear it.
-
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It cannot be contended from the evidence, that Mr. Huggins had
any specific authority to make a settlement and release.
He was,
it is true, their attorney in Court, to conduct the cause to a final
judgment; but this gave him no authority out of Court to put an
end to it at his election, upon terms satisfactory to himself. It is
true Huggins swears, that he was especially authorized to settle
with the defendant, and discharge the suit; and this is substantially
all the evidence the defendant adduces to make out such authority.
On the other hand, Mr. Derwort as distinctly denies it, and insists
that he gave no such authority. We do not feel at liberty to give
credit to the testimony of Mr. Huggins; for his own narration of
the matter, and his admitted deceptive conduct and declarations,
destroy the credibility of his testimony. The transaction, viewed
most favorably for Mr. Huggins, reflects no honor upon his fidelity
and integrity; but rather, it would seem, that under a momentary
pressure, he has abused his client's confidence, and sullied the fame
of a profession which lends no countenance to deception and dishonesty.
But it is said Mr. Huggins is to be taken to have authority,
because he was the plaintiff's attorney in Court. No case has been
cited which sustains this position. An attorney is the representative of his client in Court; he is held to be authorized to commence
and conduct that cause to final judgment and execution, and to do
whatever is usual and necessary to bring about that end, through
all the forms and stages -of legal proceedings. Further, there are
cases where it is held, that he may go beyond this, as if the execution is returned unsatisfied: it has been held, he may proceed to
collect'the debt, by instituting a new suit on the judgment. In all
cases, he may give directions to the sheriff in levying the execution,
and he may receive the money from the sheriff when collected; but
he cannot receive a part of the execution and discharge the debtor;
nor can he receive anything in payment but money, nor the note
of the defendant, and much less can he compromise the action, or
the claim before judgment, for what may be satisfactory to himself.
We refrain from going into the various distinctions given in the
books on this subject. The general question of the authority of an
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attorney, has often been discussed in Courts of justice, and many
cases are to be found in which distinctions, of more or less importance, have been taken. But in none of them is it held, that an
attorney who is clothed with no other authority than what is incident to his retainer, can compromise and discharge the claim. We
find no reported case where the principles are discussed so elaborately and satisfactorily, as by Ch. J. Hosmer, in Brackett vs.
Norton, 4 Conn. R. 517. To those who wish to prosecute this
inquiry further, we refer to Smith vs. .Bossard,2 McCord's Ch. R.
409; Gaillard vs. Smart, 6 Cowen, 385; Cheever vs. Merrick, 2

N. Hamp. 376; Lewis, admx. vs. Gamage, 1 Pick. 347; Hfuston
vs. Mitchell, 14 S. & R. 807; Kellogg vs. Gilbert, 10 Johns R.
220; Commissioners of Accounts vs. Bose et al. 1 Desaus. 469;
Gorham vs. Gale, 7 Cowen, 739; Richardson vs. Talbot, 2 Bibb,
382; Gray vs. Wass, 1 Greenl. 257; Holker vs. Parker,7 Cranch,
436; Lambert vs. Sanford, 2 Blackf. 137; -Herbertvs. Alexander,
2 Call, 498; TJail vs. Conant, 15 Verm. 314; Sharp vs. Gray, 9

Bing 457; (23 E. C. L. 331.)
The other Judges were of the same opinion.
New trial advised.
In the Supreme Court of Ohio, January Term, 1853.
CHASE ET AL. VS. WASHBURN.
1. In case of a regular deposit of wheat with a warehouseman, a liability for the
value of the wheat is incurred by the depositary, in case he mixes it with other
wheat in his warehouse, and ships the same on his own account, notwithstanding
he may supply the place of the depositor's wheat by other wheat procured and
deposited in his warehouse; and the destruction, by accident, of the warehouse, and the wheat supplied to take the place of the depositor's wheat, will not
protect the depositary from this liability to the depositor.
2. In case of an irregular deposit, or mutuum, *where the obligation imposed on the
depositary, or mutuary, is to re-deliver, not the specific thing furnished, but another article of the same kind and value; or, where the depositary has the option
to return the Tpecific article received, or another of the same kind and value, in
either case the property passes to the depositary, as fully as in a case of ordinary
sale or exchange, and the risk of loss by accident follows the control or dininion
N
over the property.
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3. Where a warehouseman receives wheat, and by the consent of the owner, or in
accordance with the custom of trade, mixes the wheat in a common mass with
other wheat in his warehouse, with the understanding that he is to retain or ship
the same for sale, on his own account, at pleasure; and, on presentation of the
warehouse receipt, is either to pay the market price thereof in money, or re.deliver the wheat, or other wheat in place of it, the transaction is not a bailment,
but a sale, and the property*passes to the depositary, and carries with it the risk
of loss by accident.
4. A custom, when fully established, becomes the law of the trade in reference to
which it exists; and it will be presumed that the parties intended to conform to
it, when they have been silent on the subject.

This is a writ of error to reverse a jiudgment of the Huron
County, Common Pleas, rendered at the October Term, A. D. 1851.
The original action was assumpsit, in which the plaintiff, Washburn,
sought to recover the value of a quantity of wheat, which had been
delivered by him to the defendants, Chase & Co., as warehousemen
engaged in the produce business at the village of Milan, in said
County.
It appears from the bill of exceptions taken in the case, that on
the trial of the cause in the Common Pleas, Washburn offered in
evidence sundry warehouse receipts, given him by Chase & Co., for
wheat delivered at various times, between the month of October,
1847, and the month of August, 1849, amounting in the aggregate
to six hundred bushels and more. The receipts are similar in form
and effect, and the first in date, which may be taken as a sample
of the others, is as follows:".Milan, Ohio, Nov. 5, 1847.
"Received in store; from J. C. Washburn (by son), the following
articles, to wit: thirty bushels of wheat.
"H. CHASE & CO."
It further appears, that the agent of Washburn was introduced
as. a witness, who testified that he had been instructed by Washburn, the defendant in error, when he delivered the first load of
the wheat, not to sell.the wheat for less than one dollar per bushel,
and, if he could not get that, to leave it in store with Chase & Co.,
the plaintiffs in error, and that he told Chase that Washburn had
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five or'sik hundred bushels to draw, and that Chase, at the time,
told the agent, when'he left the first load, that they (Chase .& Co.)
would pay the highest price when Washburn should call for it.
The wheat was, accordingly, from time to time delivered; and, in
May, 1850, a demand was made for either the wheat or the money,
and both refused.
Chase then offered evidence, tending to prove that his warehouse
was burnt on the night of the 26th of October, 1849, and that there
was then consumed in it, sufficient wheat to answer all his outstanding receipts. He also offered evidence, tending to prove that the
" custom at Milan" was to store all wheat received in a "common
mass," and to ship from the same as occasion required; and that
this custom was understood by Washburn; also that the custom
was, when parties called for their pay, either to -pay the highest
market price, or deliver wheat to the holder of the receipt.
Washburn then offered rebutting evidence, tending to prove that
Chase had not sufficient wheat iii his warehouse, at the time of the
fire, to answer all his outstanding receipts, and also that the warehouse was emptied of all wheat, between the date of the last receipt
given Washburn and the time of the fire.
Upon this state of facts, the counsel for Chase asked the Court
to charge the jury, "that the customs at Milan, if known -to Washburn, in the absence of an ezpress contract, became a, part of the
contract between the parties ; and, if the jury should find that
Chase had sufficient wheat- on hand (at the time of the fire) to
answer all his outstanding receipts; that he was not liable in this
action, and that neither the mingling of the wheat, nor the 8Airment of it, would make Chase liable, if he had a sufficient amount
on hand, at the time of the fire, to answer his outstanding receipts."
The Court, however, refused to charge as requested. The bill
of exceptions sets out the charge of the Court in full, to which the
counsel for the defendants below excepted. The verdict and judgment was in favor of the plaintiff below, to reverse which this
writ of error is brought.
The errors .assigned are the following, to wit :-That there is
error:
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First.-Because the Court charged the jury, "That if they
should find that the wheat was received and put in mass with other
wheat of defendant and that received of other persons, with the
understanding that the wheat was -to be at the disposal of the
defendant, either to retain or to ship it, and with the agreement
that when the receipts were presented, the defendant would either
pay the market price therefor, or re-deliver th6 wheat, or other
wheat equal in amount and quality-then, if the jury should further
find that the wheat thus left prior to the fire had all been shipped
and disposed of, the defendant cannot be excused unless there was
an agreement between the parties, that the wheat subsequently
purchased by the defendant was to be substituted in place of that
left by plaintiff, and to be his property."
Second.-Because the Court charged the jury as follows: "Where
a warehouseman receives grain on deposit, with an understanding
that he may, if he choose, dispose of it-that he will, when
demanded, return other grain or pay for it, in case of such a disposition lie is bound to do one or the other. A subsequent purchase
of grain by the warehouseman, for the purpose of meeting the
demand for grain thus received, would not be sufficient to vest the
property in the plaintiff."
T ird.-Because the Court refused to charge the jury that the
custom at Milan, as proved by defendant, if known to plaintiff, was
a part of the contract between the parties.
Osborn and Tayflor, attorneys for plaintiff.
Worcester and Pennewell, attorneys for defendant.
BARTLEY, C. J.-To determine which of the paities in this case
shall sustain the loss of the property in question occasioned by the
kccident, it becomes necessary to ascertain the true nature and
character of the transaction between the parties, and the rights created and duties imposed thereby. It was either a contract of sale,
a mutuum, or a deposit. If a contract of sale, the right of property
passed to the purchaser on delivery, and the article was thereafter
held by him at his own risk. If a mutuum, the-absolute property
passed to the mutuary, it being a delivery to him for consumption
or appropriation to his own use, he being bound tQ restore not the
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same thing, but other things of the same kind. Thus it is held,
that if corn, wine, money, or any other thing which is not intended
to be delivered back, but only an equivalent in kind, be lost or
destroyed by accident, it is the loss of the borrower or mutuary ;
for it is his property, inasmuch as he received it for his own con-,
sumption or use, on condition that he restore the equivalent in kind.
And in this class of cases the general rule is, " _E ju8 eat periculum
cujus est dominium." (Story on Bail. see. 283; Jones on Bail.
64; 2 Raym. 916.) But if the transaction here was a deposit, the.
property remained in the bailor, and was held by the bailee at the
risk of the bailor, so long as he observed the terms of the contract
in so doing. But if the bailee shipped the wheat, and appropriated
the same to his own use, in violation of the terms of the bailment,
before the burning of his warehouse, he became liable to the bailor
for the value of the property.
What then was the real character of the transaction between the
parties? The receipt I suppose to be in the ordinary form of
warehouse receipts, and such as would be proper to be delivered by
a warehouse depositary of wheat, to the owner, upon its being
received into a warehouse for temporary safe-keeping, and to be
re-delivered to the owner on demand. The obligation or contract
which the law would imply as against the warehouseman, on the
face of such receipt, would be that he should use due diligence
in the care of the property, and that he should re-deliver it to the
owner, or to his order, on demand, upon being paid a reasonable
compensation for his services; and if the warehouseman, under sucV
circumstances, should, without the consent of the owner, mix the
wheat with other wheat belonging to himself, or wheat of other
persons, and ship the same to a foreign market, for sale, he would
be liable to the owner for the value of the wheat thus deposited
with him.
The receipts themselves are silent as to the time the wheat was
to be kept, the prie to be paid for its custody, when or how'to be
paid, who8e property it was to be after delivery into the warehouse,
and what disposition was to be made of it. But it is claimed that
inasmuch as written receipts, whether for money or other property,
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are always subject to explanation by parol, that the terms on which
this wheat was delivered can be explained by the declarations of
the parties at the time of the delivery of the first load of wheat,
and also by the custom of trade which prevailed among warehousemen at :Milan, and that by such explanation it is shown, that the
real transaction was, that the wheat-was received, and with the
consent of the depositor, put in mass ,with other wheat of the warehouseman and that received of other persons,-with the understanding that the wheat was to be at the disposal of the warehouseman,
either to retain or to ship it, and that when the receipts should be
presented by the depositor, the warehouseman should either pay
the market price therefor, or re-deliver the wheat or deliver other
wheat equal in amount and quality.
If these terms were incorporated into the contract they could not
have excused the liability of the warehouseman in this case. The
distinction between an irregular deposit, or a mutuum, and. a sale,
is-sometimes drawn with great nicety; but it is clearly marked and
has been settled by high authority. In case of a regular deposit,
the bailee is bound to return the specific article deposited; but
where the depositary is to return dnother article of the same kind
and value, or has an option to return the specific article, or another
of the same kind and value, it is an irregular deposit or mutuum,
and passes the property as fully as, a case of ordinary sale or
exchange. Sir William Jones says, "1It may be proper to mention
the distinction between an.obligation to restore the specific things,
and a _power or necessity of returning others of equal value. In
the first case, it is a regular bailment; in the second, it becomes a
debt." In the latter case he considers the whole property transferred.
.Judge Story, in his Commentaries on the Law of Bailment, says,
sec. 439, "The distinction between the obligation to restore the
gpecific -things, and- the obligation to restore other .things of the
like kind and equal in, value, holds in cases of hiring, as well a, in
cases.of deposits and gratuitous loans. In the former cases, it is a
regular bailment; in the latter, it becomes a debt or innominate
contract. Thus, according to the famous law of Alfenus, in the

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

Digest, "if an ingot of silver is delivered to a silversmith to rn Ike
an urn, the whole property is transferred, and the employee is only
a creditor of metal equally valuable, which the workman engages
to pay in a certain shape, unless it is agreed that the specific silver,
and none other, shall be wrought up into the urn."
In all this class of cases, the risk of loss by unavoidable accident, attaches to the person who takes the control or dominion over
the property. When, therefore, Washburn's wheat was delivered
to Chase & Co., and became subject to their disposal either to
retain or ship it on their own account, the property passed, and the
risk of loss by accident, followed the dominion over it.
The doctrine here adopted, was at one time somewhat obscured
by the opinion of Chief Justice Spencer, in the case of Seymour8 v.
Brown and otlzer, (19 John. Rep. 44,) in which the Court decided
that where the plaintiff delivered wheat to the defendants, on an
agreement that for every five bushels of wheat the plaintiffs should
deliver at the defendants' mill, they (the defendants) would deliver
in exchange, one barrel of flour, was a bailment, locatis operis
faciendi; and the wheat having been consumed by fire through
accident, the defendants were not liable on their agreement, to
deliver the flour. This decision, however, was disapproved of by
Chancellor Kent, as not being conformable to the true and settled
doctrine laid down by Sir William Jones, who has been styled the
great oracle o: the law of bailment, 2 Kent's Com. 464. And the
decision has been distinctly overruled by repeated subsequ6nt adjudications in the State of New York. Hurd v. West, 7 Cowen,
752; Smith v. Clark, 21 Wend. 83 ; Nforton v. Woodruff, 2 Coinstock, 153; Mallory v. Willis, 4 Comstock, 77, and Pierce v.
Skenck, 3 Hill R. 28.
The same doctrine has been affirmed in the case of Barker et al.,
v. Roberts, 8 Greenleaf's R. 101, and also Ewing v. French, 1
Blackford, R. 354. In the latter case, a quantity of wheat having
been delivered by the plaintiff to the defendants at their mill, to be
exchanged for flour, and the defendants having put the wheat into
their common stock of wheat, the mill with the wheat was afterwards casually destroyed by fire. The Court held that the de-
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fendants were liable for a refusal to deliver the flour. If in that
case the agreement of the parties had been that the flour to be
furnished should be the flour which should be manufactured from
the specific wheat delivered, instead of an exchange of wheat for
flour, it would have been a bailment, and the loss would have fallen
upon the plaintiff.
In the case of Buffum v. Merry, 8 Mason R. 478, where the
plaintiff had delivered to the defendant, cotton yarn, on a contract
to manufacture the same into cotton plaids, and the defendant was
to find the filling and to weave so many yards of plaids at eighteen
cents per yard as was equal to the value of the yarn at sixty-five
cents per pound it was held to be a sale of the yarn, -and that by
the delivery of it to the defendant, it became his property, and he
was responsible for the delivery of the plaids, notwithstanding the
loss of the'yarn by an accidental fire. But had the plaintiff and
the defendant agreed to have the particular yarn, with filling to be
found by the defendaiit, made into plaids on joint account, and the
plaids, when woven, to be divided according to their respective
interests in the value of the materials, but before the division, the
plaids had been destroyed by accident, the loss in the opinion of
Judge Story, would have been mutual, each losing the materials
furnished by himself.
The case of Slaughter v. Green et al., 1 Randolph R. 3, and
also the case of _Inglebright v. Hammond, 19 Ohio Rep. 387, are
relied upon as sustaining -the plaintiffs in error. These two cases,
on examination, do not sustain the doctrine of the case of Seymours
v. Brown, above refexred to in 19 Johns. Rep. On the contrary,
instead of an exchange of wheat for flour in each of the cases, by
the express terms of the 'contract, the flour to be returned was to
be manufactured out of the wheat furnished. In the former case,
the written receipts given for the wheat, expressly provided, that
it-is received, to be ground," which excludes the idea of passing
the ownership to the miller. And in the latter case, it was also
expressly provided by the agreement, that the flour in controversy
was -"to be made out of the wheat furnished by Hfammond," and
"the flour made therefrom was to be delivered at Steubenville, for
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said Hammond's use." In both these cases, therefore, the limitation in the agreement of the parties, imported a bailment, and not
an exchange for flour. And this character of the transaction is
not lost, either because the custom of the country in reference to
which the wheat was received, warranted the mixing of it with the
wheat of others received on like terms; or because by the express
consent of the parties, the wheat was mixed with other wheat in
the mill belonging to the miller himself. When the owners of
wheat consent to have their wheat, when delivered at a mill or a
warehouse, mixed in a common mass, each becomes the owner in
common with the others of his respective share in the common
stock. And this would not give the bailee any control over the
property, which he would not have, if the wheat of each one
was kept separate and apart. If the wheat, thus thrown into a
common mass, be delivered for the purpose of being converted into
flour, each owner will be entitled to the flour manufactured from
his proper quantity or proportion in the common stock. If a part
of the wheat held in common, belong to the bailee himself, he
could not abstract from the common stock any more than his own
appropriate share, without a violation of the terms of the bailment,
and such a breach of his engagement could not be cured by his procuring other wheat, to be delivered to supply the place of that thus
wrongfully taken. But if the wheat be thrown into the common
heap, with the understanding or agreement that the person receiving it, may take from it at pleasure, and appropriate the same
to the use of himself or others, on the condition of his procuring
other wheat to supply its place, the dominion over the property
passes to the depositary, and the transaction is a sale, and not a
bailment.
It is claimed that the Court of Common Pleas erred in refusing
to charge the jury as requested, "that the customs among warehousemen at Milan, in the absence of an express contract, if known
to Washburn, became a part of the contract."
A custom, it is true, is not admissible, either to contradict or
alter the terms or legal import of a contract, or to change the title
to property, by varying a general rule of law. But a custom when
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fully established, becomes the law of the trade in reference to which
it exists; and the presumption is that the parties intended to conform to it, when they have been silent on thd subject. Its office is
to interpret the otherwise indeterminate intentions of the parties,
and to ascertain the nature and extent of their contracts, arising,
not from express -stipulations, but from mere implications and presumptions, and of acts of doubtful and equivocal character, I am
not prepared to say that the "cu s tom8 at, Milan," if fully established, and known to both the parties, to a contract for the delivery of vheat to a warehouseman, may not be regarded as law as
well as the customs of London or of Kent. But unfortunately for
the plaintiffs in error, the "1customs at Milan," as the evidence
tended to prove, according to the Bill of Exceptions, very clearly
showed the transaction between the parties in this case, to be a
contract of sale, and no'. a bailment. Had the Court, therefore,
charged as requested upon this point, it could not have aided the
defence set up against the action.. So that if the Court did err in
this particular, no injury was thereby done to the' plaintiffs in error.
The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas affirmed.

An the Supreme Court of Nrew Jersey.
CATHARINE MURRAY vs. TIE NEW JERSEY

RAILROAD AND

TRANSPOR-

TATION COMPANY.'

1. The Court will order the venue changed, even when laid in the proper county,
if it appears that a fair trial cannot be had there.
2. In order to warrant a ihauge of venue, it must appear that a fair trial cannot
be had in the county where it is laid by positive evidence or facts, and not by the
mere opinion of'thc witnesses.

This was an action on the case, by the plaintiff, for negligence in
the management of the ferry of the defendants, toy means whereof
the plaintiff was injured, and lost one of her limbs.
I We are indebted to A. 0. Zabriskie, Esq., the State Reporter, for this case, who
has obligingly furnished us with the sheets of 3 Zab., in advance of publication.
Th s case will be found reported in 8 Zab., p. 63, which is not yet published.
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The -defendants applied for a change of venue, on the ground
that a fair trial could not be had in the county of Hudson, where
the venue was laid. The defendants read affidavits to show that a
controversy existed between the board of freeholders of Hudson
county and the defendants, respecting the right of the freeholders
to regulate the tolls on the ferry in question, and, that, in the
opinion of deponents, there was an excited feeling through the
county, which would prevent a fair trial. The plaintiff read counter
affidavits ot witthesses, as to the state of feeling in the county, and
the opinion of the witnesses as to a fair trial.
The county of Hudson, where the venue was laid, was the
county where the plaintiff resided, where the process was served,
and where one terminus of the ferry on which the accident occurred was situate, the accident hiving occurred at the New York side.
Whitehead, in support of the motion.
Zabriskie, contra.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
GREEN,0C. J.-A motion is made, on behalf of the defendants,,
to change the venue in this cause, on the ground that a fair and
impartial trial cannot be had in- the county of Hudson, where the
venue is laid. The action is brought to recover damages for aninjury sustained by the plaintiff in crossing the ferry from Jersey
City to New York, by reason of the alleged carelessness and mismanagment of the defendants in conducting the ferry. The affidavits produced in support of the'motion show1. The fact that a controversy is now depending between the
defendants, who are the lessees of the ferry, and the board of
chosen freeholders of Hudson county, respecting the right of the
said freeholders to regulate the tolls of the ferry.
2. The belief of the witness that, owing to the prevalence of
excitement and hostile feelings against the owners *f the ferry, a
fair and impartial trial in this cause cannot be had before a jury of
of the county of Hudson.
If the board of chosen freeholders or the inhabitants of the
county of Hudson had a direct interest in the result of this suit, it
might afford good ground for a change of venue. May]or of Poole
32

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

vs. Bennet, 2 Stran. 874. But the mere fact, that a controversy
is pending respecting the right of the freeholders to regulate the
tolls upon a ferry of which the defendants are the lessees, can be
of no importance upon this motion, except as it may tend to
strengthen the belief that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had

in the county.
!The power of the Court to change the veuue, whenever it is
necessary to secure a fair and impartial trial, cannot be doubted.
The facts relied upon as the foundation for the exercise of the
power should be clearly established. They should not rest upon
the mere opinion or belief of witnesses. Rez vs., Harris,3 Burr.
1333; Meldrum vs. Sarvis, Coxe, 206; .Den vs. Evaul, Coxe, 285.
Nor will the power ordinarily be exercised upon proof of the
prefalence of excitement in the county upon the subject matter of
the suit. The Court will not,' from that fact alone, infer that a
fair and impartial trial cannot be had. Reliance will be placed
upon the intelligence and integrity of jurors, and the venue will
not be changed, unless it clearly appear to be essential to the ends
of.juftice. Mylock vs. Saladine, 3 Burr. 1564; Bowman vs. ly,
2 Wend. 250; Messenger vs. Holmes, 12 Wend. 203; Zabriskie

vs. Bauden, 1 Caines, 487; New Windsor Turnpike Company vs.
Wilion, 3 Caines, 127.
In the present case the alleged excitement.does not relate to the
subject matter of this suit; nor is it directed against these defendants, but against other parties, and relates to a subject matter not
involved in this controversy.
The belief of the witness, moreover, that a fair -and impartial
trial cannot be- reasonably expected in the county where the venue
is laid, is met by the affidavits of two witnesses on the part of the
Paintiffwho expiess their belief that no such excitement exists
in the county of Hudson, either against .the proprietors of the ferry
or against these defendants, as would prevent a fair and impartial
trial by a jury of that county.
The motion is -denied.'
Foi the practice in the mode of changing the venue, see Bagnall vs" Shipham, 1
Youngb & Jervis 878, notep 3 Chitty's Gen. Pr. 646.

